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consider whether the director or member retains a fiduciary duty to the debtor. This 
memorandum explores what these mechanisms are and when they are void against public policy 
in a fourfold approach. Part I addresses the public policy issues that courts must consider when 
dealing with a creditor’s efforts to control a company’s bankruptcy filing. Part II examines what 
a blocking director is and when it is used. Part III explains what a golden share member is and 
when it is used. Finally, Part IV concludes that a creditor cannot generally block a debtor from 
filing for bankruptcy unless the creditor’s designee retains a fiduciary duty to the debtor.  
 
I. A Natural Person and Corporate Entity Have a Right to File for Bankruptcy. 
Because corporate entities, like a natural person as defined in section 101(41) of the 
United States Bankruptcy Code (“Code”), have the right to voluntarily file for bankruptcy,4 
“prohibiting such entities from availing themselves of the bankruptcy laws . . . is generally 
considered bad form.”5 In In re General Growth Properties, Inc., the United States Bankruptcy 
Court for the Southern District of New York decided whether a business trust was eligible to file 
for chapter 11 bankruptcy.6 Under the Code, a person, which includes a corporation, may be a 
debtor under chapter 7 and 11.7 In General Growth, a creditor challenged the eligibility of the 
debtor, a business trust, to file for bankruptcy.8 The court was reluctant to find that a business 
trust was not a corporation and thus ineligible to file for bankruptcy.9 The court held that a 
                                                
4 See Klingman v. Levinson, 831 F.2d 1291, 1296 (7th Cir. 1987), 
5 In re Lake Mich. Beach Pottawattamie Resort, LLC, 547 B.R. at 911-12 (citing In re Gen. 
Growth Properties, Inc., 409 B.R. 43, 49 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009)). 
6 Gen. Growth, 409 B.R. at 70. 
7 11 U.S.C. § 101(41); 11 U.S.C. § 109(d). 
8 Gen. Growth, 409 B.R. at 55. 
9 Gen. Growth, 409 B.R. at 72. 
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business trust is a corporation for purposes of bankruptcy and rejected the argument that the 
debtor was unable to file for bankruptcy.10  
Courts are reluctant to find that a corporation or a person as defined within the Code is 
ineligible to file for bankruptcy.11 The public policy courts are protecting is to “assure access to 
the right of a person, including a business entity, to seek federal bankruptcy relief.”12 Some 
corporations create devices, such as single-purpose entities (“SPE”), to eliminate the risk that a 
borrower will file for bankruptcy. “Bankruptcy-remote structures [or SPEs] are devices that 
reduce the risk that a borrower will file bankruptcy or, if bankruptcy is filed, ensure the creditor 
procedural advantages in the proceedings.”13 An SPE is an entity that is created with assets but 
has limited or no operations.14 The entity may not file for bankruptcy without the unanimous 
consent of all of its directors.15 The entity also acts as the borrower and the guarantor of the 
loan.16 Additionally, “the organizational documents of the entity provide that the prohibited 
actions may not be taken if a specific director’s seat is vacant, and that director is nominated by 
the secured creditor.”17. Although filing for bankruptcy must be done in accordance with state 
corporate law and corporate formalities,18 courts will invalidate SPE provisions if they eliminate 
the debtor’s the right to voluntarily file for bankruptcy.19  
II. What is a Blocking Director and When is it Used in Bankruptcy? 
                                                
10 Id. at 71-71. 
11 See generally Gen. Growth, 409 B.R. at 72. 
12 In re Intervention Energy Holdings, LLC, 553 B.R. at 265. 
13 Michael T. Madison, et. al., The Law of Real Estate Financing, § 13:38 (2008). 




18 In re N. Wacker, LLC, 510 B.R. 854, 858 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2014), 
19 See In re Lake Mich. Beach Pottawattamie Resort, LLC, 547 B.R. 899. 
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In general, a corporation’s bylaws will provide that the corporation may file for 
bankruptcy only upon a majority vote of its directors. In some instances, a corporation’s bylaws 
may require unanimous vote by its directors. A creditor that has leverage over a corporation may 
insist on the appointment of a blocking director on the corporation’s board. A blocking director, 
while having no statutory basis in bankruptcy, is a common tool used by creditors to reduce the 
risk that a debtor will file for bankruptcy.20 The purpose of a blocking director is apparent: to 
withhold its vote and block a voluntary bankruptcy petition.21 “One specific director, chosen by 
the secured creditor, may withhold its vote and this block, hence the name, a voluntary 
bankruptcy petition.”22 The blocking director is the cornerstone of a SPE or a “bankruptcy 
remote entity.”23 However, a blocking director is not limited to an SPE.24 In In re Lake Michigan 
Beach Pottawattamie Resort, LLC, the debtor, after defaulting on its loan to the creditor, 
contracted for the creditor to have blocking director on the debtor’s board approximately ten 
months after their lender/lendee relationship began in order for the creditor to forbear pursuing 
remedies for the default.25 Companies go through with this method because most other simpler 
prohibitions against filing for bankruptcy are void as against public policy.26  
III. What is a Golden Share Member and When is it Used? 
A golden share is “a type of share that gives its shareholder veto power over changes to 
the company’s charter.”27 The holder of the golden share obtains the right “to veto certain critical 
                                                
20 Michael T. Madison, et. al., The Law of Real Estate Financing, § 13:38. 
21 In re Lake Mich. Beach Pottawattamie Resort, LLC, 547 B.R. at 911. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. 
24 See Id. at 903-04. 
25 547 B.R. at 903. 
26 Id. at 911. 
27 In re Intervention Energy Holdings, LLC, 553 B.R. at 262 n.9. 
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company decisions.”28 A golden share member has the ability to control a company.29 The holder 
can “overrule the wishes of all of the other shareholders, even if those other shareholders 
constitute a majority of the ownership.”30 One of the veto rights of a golden share member 
generally is the right to veto a bankruptcy filing by the debtor.31  
The term “golden share” was first used in the United Kingdom during the 1980s.32 A 
golden share was mainly used to refer to a government retaining control over newly privatized 
companies.33  
IV. Parties Cannot Contract Away the Fiduciary Duty Owed From a Creditor to a 
Debtor in an SPE Provision Without Violating Both State and Federal Public Policy. 
Courts are reluctant to enforce contractual provisions and bylaws that eliminate the 
fiduciary duty owed from the director to the debtor. In In re Lake Michigan Beach Pottawattamie 
Resort, LLC, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Illinois held that a 
blocking director provision was invalid because it impermissibly eliminated the fiduciary duty 
owed by the creditor to the debtor, and thus, was void as against public policy.34 The debtor 
granted a mortgage and assignment of rents to BCL – Bridge Funding (“BCL”) to secure a loan 
and a line of credit given by BCL to the debtor.35 The debtor defaulted on its payment and the 
                                                
28 Id. 




31 Eric L. Johnson & Mark G. Stingley, First Glance: Feature, Intervention Energy Holdings: 
Good Public Policy, or Unnecessary Intrusion into State Law? 35 ABIJ 20 (2016). 
 
32 Christine O’Grady Putek, Comment: Limited But Not Lost: A Comment on the ECJ’s Golden 
Share Decisions, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 2219, 2222 (2004). 
33 Id. 
34 547 B.R. at 914. 
35 Id. at 903. 
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debtor and creditor created a Forbearance Agreement.36 At BCL’s request, the debtor agreed to 
execute an amendment to its operating agreement (the “Third Amendment”) establishing BCL as 
a “Special Member” with the right to approve or disapprove any material action by the debtor.37 
The provision requires the debtor to obtain BCL’s consent, which could be withheld for any 
reason, before filing for bankruptcy.38 The agreement also contained a waiver of the fiduciary 
duty owed by the special member to the debtor by stating that BCL was not obligated to consider 
any interests but their own and has no obligation to give any consideration to the debtor’s 
interests.39 When the debtor filed for bankruptcy, four out of five directors voted in favor of the 
filing, with BCL withholding its vote.40 BCL, in its motion to dismiss the debtor’s chapter 11 
case, argued that the debtor was not authorized to file for chapter 11 bankruptcy because the 
debtor did not have the consent of the blocking director.41  
 The court determined that the use of a blocking director and the requirement of a 
unanimous vote by the directors in order for a debtor to file for bankruptcy was permissible 
under Michigan law.42 The court then analyzed whether the blocking director described in the 
Third Amendment was against public policy.43 Relying on case law, the court noted that a 
corporate entity cannot contract away its right to file for bankruptcy.44 A director, including a 
blocking director has a fiduciary duty to the corporate entity.45 The prohibition on the debtor to 
be unable to file for bankruptcy without consent from the blocking director, as noted in the Third 
                                                
36 Id. at 903. 
37 Id. at 903-04. 
38 Id. at 904. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. at 909. 
42 Id. at 910. 
43 Id. at 911. 
44 Id. at 912. 
45 Id. 
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Amendment, is impermissible as against public policy because it (1) provided that BCL did not 
have a fiduciary duty to the debtor, and (2) allowed BCL (as the blocking director) to block the 
debtor’s bankruptcy filing.46  
In In re Intervention Energy Holdings, LLC, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the 
District of Delaware held that a provision requiring the consent of a creditor for a bankruptcy 
filing is “tantamount to an absolute waiver” of the right to file for bankruptcy and is “void as 
contrary to federal public policy” where the creditor did not have a fiduciary duty to the debtor.47 
In this case, the debtor and the creditor entered into a Note Purchase Agreement whereby the 
creditor “provided up to $200 million in senior secured notes.”48 The secured notes were secured 
by liens on the debtor’s assets.49 The debtor and the creditor then entered into Amendment No. 3 
to the original Note Purchase Agreement that contained several Maintenance Covenants.50 When 
the debtor failed to comply with those Maintenance Covenants, the creditor and the debtor 
entered into Amendment No. 5, Forbearance Agreement, and Contingent Waiver.51 “As a 
condition to the effectiveness of the Forbearance Agreement,” the debtor issued a common unit 
to EIG (the creditor). Under the company’s limited liability company agreement, a bankruptcy 
filing was subject to the unanimous approval of the holder of common units.52 The United States 
Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware noted that “but for the Amendment, [the debtor] 
would have been authorized to seek federal bankruptcy relief.”53  
                                                
46 Id. at 913-14. 
47 553 B.R. at 265. 
48 Id. at 261. 
49 Id. 
50 Id. 
51 Id. at 261. 
52 Id. 
53 Id. 
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 The debtor in In re Intervention Energy Holdings, LLC, relying on the holding in In re 
Lake Michigan Beach Pottawattamie Resort LLC, argued that the “golden share” given to the 
creditor is similar to the blocking director in In re Lake Michigan.54 The debtor further argued 
that because the creditor did not owe the debtor a fiduciary duty, the provision requiring 
unanimous consent from all creditors before the debtor could file for bankruptcy should be void 
as against federal public policy.55 The court agreed.56 The court, citing to several cases, noted 
that a debtor may not contract away their right to file for bankruptcy.57 The Bankruptcy Court 
stated that the federal public policy is to “assure access to the right of a person, including a 
business entity, to seek federal bankruptcy relief.”58 Because the sole purpose of the provision 
was to place in the hands of a single creditor the authority to block the debtor from filing for 
bankruptcy without a owing a fiduciary duty to said debtor, the provision, the court held, is void 
as against federal public policy even though it may be permitted by state law.59  
Conclusion 
 Blocking directors, golden shares, and SPE’s are generally permissible under state law. 
However, courts have been reluctant to enforce a provision, such as a blocking director or a 
golden share provision, where the parties contract away the fiduciary duty owed by the creditor 
because the provision and the withholding of consent denies the debtor the right to voluntarily 
file for bankruptcy and, thus, is void as against both state and federal public policy. Because of 
                                                
54 Id. at 262; see In re Lake Mich. Beach Pottawattamie Resort LLC, 547 B.R. 899. 
55 In re Intervention Energy Holdings, LLC, 553 B.R. at 262. 
56 Id. at 265. 
57 Id. at 263; see also Klingman v. Levinson, 831 F.2d 1292 n.3 (7th Cir. 1987) (“For public 
policy reasons, a debtor may not contract away the right to discharged in bankruptcy.”); see also 
Hayhoe v. Cole, 226 B.R. 647, 651-54 (9th Cir. BAP 1998) (“If any terms in the Consent 
Agreement . . . exist that restrict the right of the debtor parties to file bankruptcy, such terms are 
not enforceable.”). 
58 Id. at 265. 
59 Id. 
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the fiduciary duty owed by the director, the director, albeit appointed by a creditor, cannot 
withhold consent without having the best interest of the debtor in mind. Therefore, a creditor 
may only withhold consent from a debtor to file for bankruptcy when they find that it is in the 
best interest of the debtor to not file for bankruptcy.  
